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Abstract.Designing security, from the hardware level, is essential to ensure the integrity of the intelligent 
cyber-physical infrastructure that is the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). If intelligent cyber-physical 
infrastructure fails to do the right things because it is insecure and vulnerable, then there will be negative 
social consequences [1]. Security is, in a sense, the access control to IIoT systems, which increasingly relies 
on the ability to compose different policies. Therefore, the advantage in any framework for compiling 
policies is that it is intuitive, formal, expressive, application-independent, as well as expandable to create 
domain-specific instances. Recently, such a scheme was proposed based on Belnap logic FOUR2 [2]. Four 
values of the Belnapbilattice have been interpreted as grant, deny, conflict, or unspecifiedwith respect to 
access-control policy. Belnap's four-valued logic has found a variety of applications in various fields, such 
as deductive database theory, distributed logic programming, and other areas. However, it turns out that the 
truth order in FOUR2 is a truth-and-falsity order at the same time [3]. The smallest lattice, where the orders 
of truth and falsity are independent of each other, which is especially important for security policy, is that 
of Shramko-Wansing’sSIXTEEN3. This generalization is well-motivated and leads from the bilattice 
FOUR2 with an information and a truth-and-falsity ordering to another algebraic structure, namely the 
trilattice SIXTEEN3 with an information ordering together with a truth ordering and a (distinct) falsity 
ordering.Based onSIXTEEN3 and new Boolean predicates to control access [4], we define an expressive 
access-control policy language, having composition statements based on the statements of Schramko-
Wansing’s logic. Natural orderings on politics are obtained by independent lifting the orders of truth and 
falsity of trilattice, which results in a query language in which conflict freedom analysis can be developed. 
The reduction of formal verification of queries to that on predicates over access requests enables to carry 
out policy analysis. We evaluate our approach through examples of control access model policy. 
1Introduction 
By access control we understand methods or 
mechanisms that decide whether requests to access some 
resource should be granted or denied. For example, 
operating systems need to control which users and 
applications can read, write, or delete which files; 
networks need to govern which packets can pass through 
a physical or logical perimeter; and managers need to 
control which employees can perform which workflows 
within an organization. 
We take responses of an access control systemto be 
the values‟T, F, Both, None‟, according to Belnap logic. 
The meaning ofthese values can be described asfollows: 
• an atomic sentence is stated to be true only (T) 
• an atomic sentence is stated to be false only (F) 
• an atomic sentence is stated to be both true and false, 
for instance, by different sources, or in different points 
of time (Both), and 
• an atomic sentence status is unknown. That is, neither 
true, nor false (None). 
These values and their two orderings form a 
distributive, interlaced bilattice [2, 3]. 
Thus,bilatticeFOUR2 has many convenient properties, for 
example: ∧ and ∨ distribute as in propositional logic, as 
do ⊗ and ⊕, and all these operators are also monotone 
to both the information andlogic orderings. 
In this paper we extend use of multivalued logics for 
dealing with incomplete and inconsistent information to 
SIXTEEN3[5, 10]. The five information levels, five 
logical levels and five levels of falsity in trilattice of 
sixteen truth values are arranged in three meet-
distributive lattices.   One of the interesting observations 
involves computation of ‟anaccess is granted∧anaccess 
is notrejectable‟. The conclusion is based on the rule that 
a conjunction is true if and only if both conjuncts are 
true. Since there is no truth value such that both an 
access is granted,and an access is not rejectablehas it, 
the result is the empty set. 
Motivation.Imagine two access control policies, each 
of which reports a Boolean representing whether an 
access should be permitted or not. We can form four 
possible sets by collecting the statements: {grant}, 
conflict  {grant,deny}, {deny}, and undefined {}. For 
example, the set {grant, deny} arises when one policy 
permits the access and the other denies it. The empty set 
 {} arises when the access is outside the domain of both 
policies. We can order these sets in two different ways. 
If we order by the degree to which the access is 
permitted, we have that {grant} is greatest and {deny} is 
least. We can also order by the amount of information 
we have obtained. In this ordering conflict is greatest and 
undefined is least. We write ≤ t for the truth ordering and 
≤ k for the knowledge (information) ordering.  
But if we give formal definitions for the partial order 
relations (≤ k and ≤ t), we get following [3]: The definition 
of ≤ k is very simple: for any x, y∈FOUR2, x ≤ kyiffx⊆y. 
With the ≤ t ratio, the situation is not so trivial. If we 
define for each element of FOUR2 its "truth-containing 
part" and "lie-containing part": x
t
 := {z∈x | z = T};   xf := 
{z∈x | z = F}, then we can make sure that: x≤ tyiffx
t⊆yt 
and y
f⊆xf. This suggests that truth and lies in Belnap's 
logic are not completely independent concepts: Belnap's 
logic suggests that the very meaning of "lie" is not only 
less true than the meaning of "truth," but also the 
meaning of "neither truth, not a lie ". 
Next consider the issue of access control policies 
containing both “permit rules” and “deny rules”. A 
permit rule returns true
(+)
, if the access is granted, 
andfalse
(+)
, if the access is not granted (but not 
obligatorily rejectable). Deny rules work symmetrically, 
i.e. return true
( )
, if the access is denied, and false
( )
, if 
there is no explicit denial (but is notgranted). Much 
recent work on access control has considered “permit 
rules”.However, the logic of generalized truth values that 
comes with trilatticeSIXTEEN3 and the propositional 
language Ltf allows to solve using“deny rules”many 
problemsin the most natural way. Moreover, if the three 
partial orderings ≤ t, ≤ f, and ≤ i are used to define 
orderings on valuations, different kinds of non-
monotonic inference relations can be defined in terms of 
minimizing or maximizing truth, falsity, or information. 
Contributions.We consider equivalence between 
different presentations of multivalued data, and obtain a 
parametric expression for an access policy as a 
combination of “permit rules” and “deny rules”. Since 
the set SIXTEEN3 is the smallest multivalued lattice 
having two independent orderings: in true and in falsity, 
it is necessary to consider the presentation of access 
models based on the SIXTEEN3. The role of falsity order 
in consequence relations important for the control of 
communication was determined distinctly, which 
allowed to overcome shortcomings of the use of 
bilatticeFOUR2. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related 
work and statements from many-valued logic are 
discussed in Section 2 and 3,respectively. The main 
results of the paper are placed in Section 3– 8. The paper 
ends with discussions in Section 9. 
2Related works 
The notion of a bilattice was first introduced into logic 
and artificial intelligence by M. Ginsberg and M. 
Fitting[6, 7].With respect to deductive databases, their 
ideas were supported by [5]. 
A very clear and useful introduction into bilattices 
and application problems in access control is [8]. In most 
security systems the management of policies is not 
considered to include neither explicit nor hidden 
inconsistencies. In real life situation information often 
come from different contradicting sources. Thus, 
different sources can provide inconsistent data while 
deductive reasoning may result in hidden inconsistencies. 
The idea in Belnap‟sapproach[9] is to develop a logic that 
is not dependable on inconsistencies.  
The logic of generalized truth values has been 
developed in a number of papers by M. Dunn, Y. 
Shramko, S.P. Odintsov, and H. Wansing, who consider 
logics defined on trilattices. These investigations have 
been summarized in [10, 11]. 
Fuzzy logic is a form of multi-valued logic later 
popularized as logic of vagueness by Zadeh as was 
reviewed by [12]. It is based on replacing the standard 
set of Boolean truth values with a different lattice, most 
often, like in the present paper, the unit interval. Saying 
that a formula ϕhas truth value r∈ [0,1] then means that 
ϕholds with degree r, which would apply to typical 
vague qualiﬁcations such as a given person being tall (in 
contrast to assigning a probability p∈ [0,1] to ϕ, which 
would be read as saying that ϕ is either completely true 
with probability p or completely false with probability 1 
− p, as in „the die under the cup shows a 3 with 
probability p‟). 
3Meet-distributive lattices 
Let P be a non-empty ordered set. If sup {x, y} and inf{x, 
y} exist for all x, y ∈P, then P is called a lattice [13].A 
complete lattice is a partially ordered set in which all 
subsets have both a supremum (join) and an infimum 
(meet). A lattice L is meet-distributive if every coatomic 
interval is Boolean.A billatice is a set equipped with two 
partial orderings ≤ t and ≤ k.  
The four truth values are arranged in a logical lattice 
[2] on Figure1. A logical conjunction and logical 
disjunction are related to the meet operation and to the 
join operation respectively. 
 
Fig. 1. The Belnapbilattice:with synonyms for access 
control decisions in parentheses. 
Let us consider the following bounded lattices: fuzzy 
data [14,15,16]: then C[0, 1]is the infinite set of real 
numbers from 0 to 1. For any ground atom r(d)∈H the p 
= I(r (d)) represents its plausibility.  
 The quantity p is determined as a closed 
subinterval[17,18,19]: W = C[0, 1] is the set of all closed 
subintervals. For any ground atom r(d) ∈H the (L, U) = 
Imv(r (d)) represents the lower and upper bounds for an 
expert‟s evaluationofr(d).Thegeneralized truth-value 
space has as a base a setI = (T, F, t, f) containing the 
initial truth values: T an access is granted, 1,1 , 0,1
;F  an access isdenied, 0,0 , 0,1 ;t an access is not 
rejectable, 0,1 , 0,0 , andf  an access is rejectable, 
0,1 , 1,1 . The power set P(I) gives sixteen values with 
the presentation as closed subintervals in Table 1: 
Table 1.Levels of trilattice SIXTEEN3. 
 Information 
1 0,1 , 0,1  
2 1,1 , 0,1 0,0 , 0,1 0,1 , 0,0 0,1 , 1,1  
3 1,0 , 0,1 1,1 , 0,0 1,1 , 1,1 0,0 , 0,0  
0,0 , 1,1 0,1 , 1,0  
4 1,0 , 0,0 1,0 , 1,1 1,1 , 1,0 0,0 , 1,0  
5 1,0 , 1,0  
For example, {T, t} = 1,1 , 0,1 i 0,1 , 0,0 = 
1,1 , 0,0  (see Appendix). 
The three partial orderings ≤ i, ≤ t, ≤ f arrange elements 
according to the possessed degree of information, truth 
and falsity, respectively. The ≤ f is the falsity order: 
„falsity‟ decreases if the access is granted.The sixteen 
truth values are arranged in the falsity meet-distributive 
lattice on Figure 2. The details relative to the three 
partial orderings are shown in Appendix (Table 4). 
Table 2.Policy language: the rp are access predicates, 
and b {F, T}. 
p::=([x,y],[z,v]) Policy 
b ifrp Basic policy [2] 
([1-y,1-x],[1-v,1-z]) Logical negation 
([min {x, x1}, min {y, y1}], 
[max {z, z1}, max {v, v1}]) 
Logical meet 
([1-x,1-y],[1-z,1-v]) 
Falsity negation 
([max {x, x1}, max {y, y1}], 
[max {z, z1}, max {v, v1}]) 
Disjunction; p q 
4Policies 
We take responses of an access control system to be the 
values ([x,y],[z,v])of the sixteen generalized truth 
valuesspace, which we write asSIXTEEN3. These values 
and their three orderings form a distributive, interlaced 
bilattice. 
 
 
Fig. 2.Falsity meet-distributive lattice. 
 
Consequence relations |=tand |=f are extensions 
ofimplication toSIXTEEN3. For each logical order a 
separate entailment relation between any sentences A, B 
Ltf was defined in [20]: 
A|=tBiff
16 16 16
tv v A v B , and 
A|=f Biff
16 16 16
fv v B v A . 
There it was proved that both of these restrictions 
coincide in fact with Belnap‟s four-valued logic. 
Expression a b with a,b∈SIXTEEN3yieldsb if a is 
lessor equal to T in the falsityordering and yields T 
otherwise. Table 2 gives the syntax of access control 
policy language. Informally, an expression for every 
access a:: = {(r(d), I(r(d))) | r(d)  A, whereA H}  is 
interpreted as a mapping from accesses to elements of 
Ltf. If policy p produces result on access a and policy q 
produces result  on a, then p∧q produces result ∧ on 
a. The other 
Belnapoperatorsaresimilarlyinterpretedonpolicies. 
Theintuition behind these policy operators is that: 
• p denies an access iffp grants it (and vice versa)  
• p∧q grants an access iff both p and q grant it, and 
denies an access iff at least one of p and q denies it  
• p⊃q grants an access iffp does not grant it or q does 
grant it, and p⊃q denies an access if p grants it and q 
denies it  
• p⊕q grants (resp. denies) an access iffp or q grants 
(resp. denies) it. 
Theonlyoperatorinthe policy 
languagenotderivedfromBelnaplogic is the basic 
expression b ifrp, where b ranges over {F, T}, and rp is 
an access predicate. Informally, the b ifrp “rule” gives 
result b for an access satisfying rp and gives result ⊥ 
otherwise. The idea is that rp deﬁnes the domain of 
 accesses covered by the rule, so that ⊥ is produced on 
accesses outside of the rule‟s domain. 
5Queries 
Properties about policies and their relationships can be 
expressed as queries, propositional formulas in which 
the atomicpropositionsconcernthetruthor falsity 
orderingamongpolicies. Table 3 givesthesyntax for 
queries.  
Table 3.Query language: p and q range over policy 
expressions. 
, ::= Query 
p tq Truth ordering 
p fq Falsity ordering 
rpc(a,b) = ( a b) 
Confidentiality 
request 
rpi(a,b) = (a b) 
Integrity request 
In [4], we defined expressions for basic policies in a 
natural way, based on material implication, as a rigorous 
expression of the information flow operator [21], as 
logical formulas for some predicate query symbols: 
confidentialityrequest(Bell–LaPadula),  
integrityrequest(Biba),   
wherea the class ofconfidentiality/integrityof subject, 
andb– the class of object (a, b {0,1}). 
6Example for analysis 
Access control refers to mechanism by which the access 
of principals to resources is regulated, ascan be seen in 
the following example of the access referring to the 
transport resources.  
Generally, access control is implemented by an 
authorization service, which includes an authorization 
decision function (ADF) for deciding whether a user 
request to access a resourceshould be permitted or not. 
The output of ADF is usuallydetermined by evaluating 
the request with respect to authorization state. The 
authorization policy, which is implemented by the ADF, 
is to authorize arequest if it is listed in the authorization 
state[22]. 
A group of students of School of Space and 
Information Technologiesin Krasnoyarsk is planning a 
trip to see the Pillars Nature Sanctuary (Stolby). 
Normally, it takes aboutone hour to get to the Right 
Bank across the Yenisei Riverby car, but the students 
know that no-one of locals needs to be told that 
Kopylovski Bridge Expressway (KB)is “the longest 
parking lot”. 
The students consult a traffic service, which 
integrates information from several independent 
information sources to provide traffic advisory along 
various travel routes. They have a combination of 
several sources. Let us assume that these sources are: 
 weather forecast (rain, snow, fog); 
 social activity; 
 police activity; 
 road reparation. 
The service uses the following rules to generate 
advisories: 
If the weather is bad, and there is road reparation 
along the route, the probability of a delay is 0.9. 
If there is road reparation, and social activities along 
the route, the likelihood of a delay is 0.8. 
If there is road reparation, and police activities along 
the route, the likelihood of a delay is 0.99. 
These rules are expressed as levels of evaluation, as 
[0.9, 1], [0.8, 1] and [0.99, 1].The service generates 
advisories expressed as the likelihood of delays along the 
routes of interest (auth state). Students do not want to 
miss the excursion due to traffic, but they also have 
conference deadlines and so do not want to leave too 
early.  
They decide that if the advisory says that the 
likelihood of delays is between 0.2 and 0.4, then they 
add one extra hour to the trip time. If the likelihood is 
between 0.4 and 0.6, then they add two hours, and if the 
likelihood is over 0.6 then they take a river-train (auth 
policy).  
In Section 8, we will return to this example and show 
that our approach improves the quality of the advisory 
and could have helped the students avoid unnecessary 
trouble. 
7Combininganswers 
We can learn levels for compound events, which include 
basic objects, having the values for basic objects.  
7.1 Case 1: Independence 
Since in the model an event can be true, false, or 
unknown, (i.e., we are modeling different factors 
independently) we have: 
Cl1 (A t B) = ([xx1, yy1], [1  (1 z)(1 z1), 1  
(1 v)(1 v1)]). 
Cl1 (A t B) = ([1 (1 x)(1 x1), 1  (1 y)(1 y1)], [zz1, 
vv1]).(1) 
7.2 Case 2: Positive correlation 
Two events A and B are positively correlated if they 
overlap as much as possible. One can obtain that the 
solution can be shown to be  
Cl2 (A tB)=([min{x,x1}, min{y, y1}], [max{z,z1}, 
max{v,v1}]). 
Cl2(A tB) =([max{ x,x1}, max{ y, y1}],[min{ z,z1},min{ 
v,v1}])                                                           (2) 
8Example for analysis(continued) 
 Returning to the example in Section 7, suppose that our 
information sources predict 50% chance of bad weather, 
parades with 50% certainty, roadwork along the 
Kopylovski Bridge with certainty 80%, and police 
activity with the probability of 40%. This information is 
expressed in this way: 
roadwork (RW):([0.8, 0.8], [0.2, 0.2]);  
social_act (SA): ([0.5, 0.5], [0.5, 0.5]); 
bad_weather (BW): ([0.5, 0.5], [0.5, 0.5]);  
police_act (PA): ([0.4, 0.4], [0.6, 0.6]). 
The traffic service fetches the above information from 
four different information sources and integrates them 
independently using these rules as in Eq. (1).Here, the 
grant and rejection are mutually complementary: 
delay, if there are roadworks and bad weather, for 
example: 
Cl1 (RW tBW) =([0.9 0.8 0.5,0.8 0.5], [0.6,0.64]). 
Eventually, one can obtain  
Cl1 (RW tBW) = ([0.36,0.4], [0.6,0.64])           (3) 
delay, if there are roadworks and the marathon: 
Cl1(RW tSA) = ([0.32,0.4], [0.6,0.68])              (4) 
If there are road works and traffic accident:  
Cl1(RW tPA) = ([0.32,0.32], [0.68,0.68])           (5) 
Using the second rule of Eq. (1) one can obtain from 
Eqs. (5) and (6): 
Cltot [(RW tBW) t (RW tSA)] = ([0.56,0.64], [0.36, 
0.44]).                                                                    (6) 
Adding Eq. (7) one has finally: 
([0.7, 0.76], [0.24, 0.3])                                    (7) 
When correlation is not considered, the evaluation of 
delay(KB) is [0.36, 1], which means that the available 
information predicts traffic delay with certainty 0.36 and 
smooth traffic with certainty [0, 0.64]. Considering the 
possibilities of parades and accidents, it is reasonable to 
up the expectation of delays.  
In contrast, our method computes the confidence 
level for traffic delays to be [0.7,0.76], which is 
narrower then the certainty factor according belief logic 
programming theory [0.63,1] [23]. Thus, we see that the 
theory can predict better expert‟s evaluation of the 
combined information. 
9Discussions 
In fact, Belnap’s interpretation suits perfectly well when 
applied to asingle computer. In addition, it presupposes 
that this computer receives information from classical 
sources, i.e., from sources, which can operate 
exclusively with classical truth values (T, F). And it 
appears that Belnap’s interpretation cannot adequately be 
applied when we deal not just with one computer but 
with several interconnected computers, i.e., a computer 
network.Indeed, consider four Belnap 
computers(C1,C2,C3,C4) connected to some central 
computer (С’1), a server, to which they are supposed to 
supplyinformation (Figure 3). Incidentally, it is 
interesting to observe that if we wish to extend our 
network andconnect our server to some “higher” 
computer (С’’1), then generalized truthvalues of the third 
order (the set P(SIXTEEN3) comes into question (and so 
on). 
 
Fig. 3.Computernetwork. 
Apparently, we should stop at the 16-digit logic, for 
example, such as SIXTEEN3. If we look at the set 
SIXTEEN3 and consider its algebraic structure, it turns 
out that within the framework of this set it is possible to 
make an effective distinction between the increase in the 
truth of the facts and the decrease of their falsity, and 
therefore one can determine the order in truth and the 
falsity order as two different and mutually independent 
orders[3]. Since the set SIXTEEN3 is the smallest 
multivalued lattice having this property, it is necessary to 
refer to the presentation of access models based on the 
SIXTEEN3. 
Future work. Our most recent work [4]  shows that it 
is posible to obtain expressions for basic policies, based 
on the information flow operator [21], as logical 
formulas for some request predicate symbols: 
− confidentiality request (Bell–LaPadula),  
− integrity request (Biba). We intend to continue our 
preliminary work in this area. 
In our current approach, we hope to develop an 
implementation of given framework to avoid the 
immediate resolution of conflicts by the choice of access 
decisions based on a set I = (T, F, t, f).   Thirdly, we 
mean to improve the language description of 
authorization state using several logical techniques. 
In conclusion, we extend a formal framework for 
authorization policies based on trilatticeSIXTEEN3; all 
possible complex patterns for base policies are supported 
in the presence of conflict or lack of information; and 
authorization state and policy specifications are cleanly 
separated. Policy composition is achieved through 
combination modes (independence, positive correlation, 
etc.), whichare familiar in the theory of deductive 
databases. They are formally analyzable and functionally 
complete for policy coordination. The parameterized 
 method not only helps on analysis of policies, but these 
types and their analysis can also certify in the future 
investigations important run-time behavior of policy 
evaluation. 
Appendix 
A.1 The algebra of confidence levels 
We shall establish the structure and properties of 
trilattices here,which is used in previous sections. 
Definition 1.Denote byC[0,1] the set of all closed 
subintervals over [0,1]. Consider the set Cc =defC[0,1] 
C[0,1]. We denote the elements of Cc as ([x, y][z, v]). 
Define the following orders on this set. Let ([x, y][z, v]), 
([x1, y1][z1, v1])be any two elements of Cc. 
([x, y][z, v]) t([x1, y1][z1, v1]) iff x x1,y y1 and z1 z,v1 v  
([x, y][z, v]) f([x1, y1][z1, v1]) iff x x1,y y1 and z z1,v v1  
([x, y][z, v]) i([x1, y1][z1, v1]) iff x x1,y1 yand z z1,v1 v 
Definition 2.Let Cc, t, f, i be as defined in Definition 
1. Then the meet and join corresponding to the truth, 
falsity and knowledge (information) orders are defined 
as follows. The symbols  and  denote meet and join, 
and the subscripts t, f, and i represent truth, falsity, and 
information (knowledge), respectively. 
1. ([x, y][z, v]) t([x1, y1][z1, v1]) =  
          ([min{x, x1}, min{y, y1}], [max{z, z1},max{v, v1}]) 
2. ([x, y][z, v]) t([x1, y1][z1, v1]) =  
([max{x, x1}, max{y, y1}], [min{z, z1},min{v, v1}]) 
3. ([x, y][z, v]) f([x1, y1][z1, v1]) =  
   ([min{x, x1}, min{y, y1}], [min{z, z1},min{v, v1}]) 
4. ([x, y][z, v]) f([x1, y1][z1, v1]) =  
          ([max{x, x1}, max{y, y1}], [max{z, z1},max{v, v1}]) 
5. ([x, y][z, v]) i([x1, y1][z1, v1]) =  
   ([min{x, x1}, max{y, y1}], [min{z, z1},max{v, v1}]) 
6. ([x, y][z, v]) i([x1, y1][z1, v1]) =  
                   ([max{x, x1}, min{y, y1}], [max{z, z1},min{v, v1}]) 
The top and bottom elements with respect to the various orders 
are as follows. 
Table 4.Bounds relative to the three partial orderings. 
Top value Bottom value 
Тt = 1,1 , 0,0  t= 0,0 , 1,1  
Тf = 0,0 , 0,0  f= 1,1 , 1,1  
Тi = 1,0 , 1,0  i= 0,1 , 0,1  
Тt corresponds to {T, t}, t corresponds to {F, f}. 
Тf corresponds to {F,t}, f corresponds to {T, f}. 
Тi corresponds to {TF, tf}, i corresponds to { }. 
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